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Abstract. An important problem in smart contract security is under-
standing the likelihood and criticality of discovered, or potential, weak-
nesses in contracts. In this paper we provide a summary of Ethereum
smart contract audits performed for 23 professional stakeholders, avoid-
ing the common problem of reporting issues mostly prevalent in low-
quality contracts. These audits were performed at a leading company
in blockchain security, using both open-source and proprietary tools, as
well as human code analysis performed by professional security engineers.
We categorize 246 individual defects, making it possible to compare the
severity and frequency of different vulnerability types, compare smart
contract and non-smart contract flaws, and to estimate the efficacy of
automated vulnerability detection approaches.
1 Introduction
Smart contracts are versatile instruments that can not only facilitate and verify
transactions in financial services, but also track the movement of physical goods
and intellectual property. Security and correctness are essential for smart con-
tract technology, because contracts possess the authority to allocate high-value
resources between complex systems and are, for the most part, autonomous.
Security researchers have worked to describe vulnerabilities and produce tools
that find flaws in smart contracts, but most of the discussions of such flaws
concentrate on a small number of actual exploits [24,20]. Moreover, many studies
examine all the contracts on a blockchain or focus on “popular” [2] contracts,
but these contracts often are produced by development efforts where security
and correctness are not prioritized. While informative, these analyses do not
represent the contracts that are likely to become the infrastructure of a smart-
contract future.
A better alternative for understanding smart contract flaws is to analyze bugs
discovered during professional security audits. Early investors in smart contracts
expose themselves to risks that could be devastating if the code is insecure or
incorrect. Given these consequences, it is more likely that an initial effort is
made to produce correct code. Therefore, flaws discovered during paid security
audits provide a better ground truth for recommending ways to improve smart
contract security. This paper presents an analysis of the types of flaws detected
in 23 Solidity/Ethereum [4,32] smart contract audits performed by Trail of Bits
(https://trailofbits.com), a leading company in the field.
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2 Related Work
To our knowledge, no previous work reports flaws detected in paid security audits
of important smart contracts. We have not even found any manual examination
of large numbers of smart contracts with reasonable criteria for removing un-
interesting contracts (which would ensure quality analysis). However, there are
other important efforts to classify or describe smart contract flaws. Atzei, Bar-
toletti, and Cimoli produced a taxonomy of possible attacks on smart contracts,
with examples of actual exploit code [1]. Their categories have some overlap with
those used in this paper, but are more focused on specific-exploit patterns and
exclude some types of flaws that are not tied to a specific attack. We believe
that every category present in their taxonomy is also represented by at least one
finding in our set. Their purpose is largely orthogonal to ours and presents a
useful alternative view of the topic, but one based more on speculation about
exploits than on concrete data about the prevalence and seriousness of flaws
in real contracts. Mense and Flatscher [16] combine a summary of known vul-
nerability types with a simple comparison of then-available tools, while Saad et
al. [23] expand the scope of analysis to general blockchain attack surfaces, but
provide a similar categorization of smart contract vulnerabilities. Dika’s thesis
also [7] provides another, earlier, summary of vulnerability types, analyses, and
tools. In general, the types of flaws discussed in these works are a subset of those
we discuss below.
Perez and Livshits provide a (provocatively titled) analysis of actual executed
exploits on 21K contracts reported in various academic papers, which provides a
useful additional perspective, but they use a very different data set with purposes
almost completely unrelated to ours [19]. They find that, while reentrancy is the
most dangerous category of problem (over 65% of actual exploits in the wild),
even reentrancy exploits have resulted in loss of less than 10K Ether to date.
The relatively small size of exploits to date vs. potential future losses affirms
that information about undetected flaws in audited high-value, high-visibility
contracts is important to the community.
Smart contract analysis/verification research often touches on the topic of
expected vulnerabilities [9,30,22,3,10,6,13,14,8,11,10,18], but this research is, to
our knowledge, always based on author perceptions of threats, not statistical
inference from close examinations of high-quality/critical contracts.
3 Summary of Findings
The results below are based on 23 audits performed by Trail of Bits. Of these,
all but five are public, and the reports are available online [29]. The number of
findings per audit ranged from 2-22, with a median and mean of 10 findings.
Reports ranged in size from just under 2K words to nearly 13K words, with
a total size of over 180K words. It is also worth mentioning that each audit
focused on a code-base that has between one to a few dozen of contracts that
Trail of Bits reviewed manually and using automated tools. The total number
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of audited contracts is thus considerably more than 23 (some individual audits
covered more than 23 contracts).
The time allotted for audits ranged from one person-week to twelve person-
weeks, with a mean of six person-weeks and a median of four person-weeks.
The audits were prepared by a total of 24 different auditors, with most audits
prepared by multiple individuals (up to five). The mean number of authors
was 2.6, and the median was three. The most audits in which a single author
participated was 12, the mean was 3.2; the median was only two audits. In
general, while these audits are all the product of a single company, there is
considerable diversity in the set of experts involved.
Most of these assessments used static and dynamic analysis tools in addition
to manual analysis of code, but the primary source of findings was manual. In
particular, a version of the Slither static analyzer [9] which included a num-
ber of detectors not available in the public version, was applied to many of the
contracts. In some cases, property-based testing with Echidna [26] and sym-
bolic analysis with Manticore [17,25] were also applied to detect some problems.
Only two audits did not use automated tools. Sixteen of the audits made use
of Slither, sixteen made use of Manticore, and thirteen made use of Echidna.
However, when Slither was used in audits, it was usually used much more ex-
tensively than Manticore or Echidna, which were typically restricted to a few
chosen properties of high interest. Only four findings are explicitly noted in the
findings as produced by a tool, all by Slither. However, other findings may have
resulted from automated analyses in a less explicit fashion.
3.1 Smart Contract Findings
Our analysis is based on 246 total findings. Tables 1 and 2 summarize information
on these findings (Table 2). Each flaw is classified according to its severity,
considering the potential impact of the exploit to be:
– High if it affects a large numbers of users, or has serious legal and financial
implications;
– Medium if it affects individual users’ information, or has possible legal im-
plications for clients and moderate financial impact;
– Low if the risk is relatively small or is not a risk the customer has indicated
is important;
– Informational if the issue does not pose an immediate risk, but is relevant
to security best practices.
Another important property of each finding is how difficult it is to exploit:
– Low for commonly exploited flaws where public tools exist or exploitation
can be easily automated;
– Medium for flaws that require in-depth knowledge of a complex system;
– High for flaws where an attacker must have privileged insider access to the
system, or must discover other weaknesses, for exploitation.
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The findings categories are sorted by the frequency of severity counts; ties in
the high-severity findings count are broken by counting medium-severity findings,
and further ties are broken by low-severity findings. Appendix A shows exact
counts for categories and severities/difficulties. Raw data is also available [28].
The categories in these tables are generally the categories used in the audit
reports submitted to clients, but in some cases we have corrected obviously
incorrect categories given the continuous evolution of the security landscape for
smart contracts. Additionally, we have introduced a few new categories in cases
where findings were clearly placed in a category of dubious relevance due to the
lack of a suitable category. The most significant systematic change is that we
separated race conditions and front-running from all other timing issues, due
to 1) the large number of race conditions relative to other timing issues; 2) the
general qualitative difference between race conditions and other timing-based
exploits (e.g., there is a large literature addressing detection and mitigation
of race conditions specifically); and 3) the specific relevance of front-running
to smart contracts. Our analysis calls special attention to findings classified as
high-low, that is high severity and low difficulty. These offer attackers an
easy way to inflict potentially severe harm. There were 27 high-low findings, all
classified as one of eight categories: data validation, access controls, numerics,
undefined behavior, patching, denial of service, authentication, or timing.
Data Validation Data validation covers the large class of findings in which the
core problem is that input received from an untrusted source (e.g., arguments to
a public function of a contract) is not properly vetted, with potentially harmful
consequences (the type of harm varies widely). Not only is this a frequently
appearing problem, with more than three times as many findings as the next most
common category, it is a serious issue in many cases, with the largest absolute
number of high-low findings (10), and a fairly high percent of high-low findings
(11%). Data validation can sometimes be detected statically, by using taint to
track unchecked user input to a dangerous operation (e.g., an array de-reference),
but in many cases the consequences are not obviously problematic unless one
understands a contract’s purpose. Ironically, the safer execution semantics of
Solidity/EVM make some problems that would clearly be security flaws in C or
C++ harder to automatically detect. In Solidity, it is not always incorrect to
allow a user to provide an array index: If the index is wrong, in many cases,
the call will simply revert, and there is no rule that contract code should never
revert. From the point of view of a fuzzer or static analysis tool, distinguishing
bad reverts from intended ones is difficult without guidance. Automated static
or dynamic analysis to detect many of the instances of missing/incorrect data
validation identified in the audits would require some user annotations, either
in the form of properties or at least annotating some functions or statements as
not expected to revert, but given that information, would likely prove effective.
Access Controls Access control findings describe cases where use of a legiti-
mate operation of a contract should be restricted to certain callers (the owner,
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Severity Difficulty
Category % High-Low High Med. Low Info. Und. High Med. Low Und.
data validation 36% 11% 21% 36% 24% 13% 6% 27% 16% 55% 2%
access controls 10% 25% 42% 25% 12% 21% 0% 33% 12% 54% 0%
race condition 7% 0% 41% 41% 6% 12% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%
numerics 5% 23% 31% 23% 38% 8% 0% 31% 8% 62% 0%
undefined behavior 5% 23% 31% 15% 31% 8% 15% 15% 8% 77% 0%
patching 7% 11% 17% 11% 39% 28% 6% 6% 11% 61% 22%
denial of service 4% 10% 20% 30% 30% 20% 0% 50% 0% 40% 10%
authentication 2% 25% 50% 25% 25% 0% 0% 50% 0% 50% 0%
reentrancy 2% 0% 50% 25% 25% 0% 0% 50% 25% 0% 25%
error reporting 3% 0% 29% 14% 0% 57% 0% 43% 29% 29% 0%
configuration 2% 0% 40% 0% 20% 20% 20% 60% 20% 20% 0%
logic 1% 0% 33% 33% 33% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%
data exposure 1% 0% 33% 33% 0% 33% 0% 33% 33% 33% 0%
timing 2% 25% 25% 0% 75% 0% 0% 75% 0% 25% 0%
coding-bug 2% 0% 0% 67% 33% 0% 0% 17% 0% 83% 0%
front-running 2% 0% 0% 80% 0% 20% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%
auditing and logging 4% 0% 0% 0% 33% 44% 22% 33% 0% 56% 11%
missing-logic 1% 0% 0% 0% 67% 33% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0%
cryptography 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%
documentation 2% 0% 0% 0% 25% 50% 25% 0% 0% 75% 25%
API inconsistency 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0%
code-quality 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0%
Table 1. Severity and difficulty distributions for finding categories. The second column
shows what percent of all findings that category represents; the remaining columns are
percentages within-category.
minters, etc.), but access control is either faulty or not implemented at all. Most
often, access control findings are cases where access control is too permissive, but
nearly a third of these findings involve overly restrictive access control. While
there are three times as many data validation findings as access control find-
ings, there are nearly as many high-low findings for access control as for data
validation. One in four access control findings is high-low, and 42% of access
control findings are high severity. In general, automatic detection of access con-
trol problems without additional specification is often plausible. In four of our
findings, it would suffice to check standard ERC20 token semantics, enforce the
paused state for a contract, or assume that only certain users should be able
to cause self-destruction. Cases where access controls are too restrictive would
require additional specification, but, given that effort, are also often likely to be
handled well by property-based testing.
Race Condition Race conditions are cases in which the behavior of a contract
depends (in an unintended way) on an improperly restricted ordering of oper-
ations or events. Often, the consequence of one particular unexpected ordering
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Category % Dynamic % Static Category % Dynamic % Static
data validation 57% 22% logic 0% 0%
access controls 50% 4% data exposure 0% 0%
race condition 6% 59% timing 50% 25%
numerics 46% 69% coding-bug 67% 50%
undefined behavior 0% 31% front-running 0% 0%
patching 17% 33% auditing and logging 0% 38%
denial of service 40% 0% missing-logic 67% 0%
authentication 25% 0% cryptography 0% 100%
reentrancy 75% 100% documentation 0% 0%
error reporting 29% 14% API inconsistency 0% 0%
configuration 0% 0% code-quality 0% 67%
Table 2. Optimistic percentages of each category detectable by automated methods.
is clearly incorrect. The race condition category had zero high-low findings, but
was responsible for seven of the 60 total high-severity findings across all audits.
The top three categories (data validation, access controls, and race conditions)
made up over half of all high-severity findings. A full 41% of race conditions are
high severity. Nearly half (nine) of the race condition findings concern a known
ERC20 issue [31], and could certainly be identified automatically by a static anal-
ysis tool. Due to the nature of many blockchain race conditions, understanding
the impact of the race would often be hard for a dynamic analysis.
Numerics Numerics findings involve the semantics of Solidity arithmetic: Most
are overflow errors, some are underflow errors, and a few involve precision losses.
These findings also include cases where a “safe math” library or function is
used, so there is no actual overflow/underflow resulting in an incorrect value,
but the resulting revert causes problems. Three numerics findings are high-low
(23%), and 31% are high severity. Rounding or precision (six findings) and over-
flow (three findings) are the most common numerics errors. Many rounding and
overflow problems can likely be flagged using static analysis, but to determine
whether the behavior is problematic would require custom properties.
Undefined Behavior The undefined behavior category includes cases where
a contract relies on unspecified or under-specified semantics of the Solidity lan-
guage or the EVM, so the actual semantic intent of the contract is either cur-
rently unclear or may become so in the future. For instance, in Solidity, the
evaluation order of expressions in the same statement is not specified. Instead,
it is only guaranteed that statements are executed in order. Three (23%) of the
undefined behavior findings are high-low, and 31% of undefined behavior findings
are high severity. Undefined behavior is often easy to statically detect.
Patching Patching findings concern flaws in the process to upgrade or change
contract behavior. The immutability of code on the blockchain requires the use
What are the Actual Flaws in Important Smart Contracts? 7
of complex, hard-to-get-right methods to allow changes. Two (11%) of the patch-
ing findings are high-low, and 17% are high severity. Many patching issues are
complex environmental problems that likely require human expertise, but some
common patterns of bad upgrade logic might be amenable to static detection,
and a dynamic analysis can detect that a contract is broken after a faulty update.
Denial of Service Denial of service covers findings that are not well described
by another class (e.g., if lack of data validation causes denial of service, we still
classify it as data validation), and where the consequence of a flaw is either
complete shut-down of a contract or significant operational inefficiency. If we
included all cases where denial of service is an important potential consequence
of a flaw, or even the only important consequence, the category would be larger.
One denial of service finding was high-low, and 20% of findings were high severity.
Most denial of service findings would require fairly complex custom properties
specifying system behavior, in part because “simple” denial of service due to
some less complex cause falls under another category.
Authentication Authentication findings specifically concern cases where the
mechanism used to determine identity or authorization is flawed, as opposed to
cases where the access rules are incorrect. That is, in authentication problems,
the logic of who is allowed to do what is correct, but the determination of “who”
is flawed. While only one authentication finding is high-low, fully half of all au-
thentication problems are high severity; in fact, authentication is tied with the
infamous reentrancy problem in terms having the greatest percentage of high
severity issues. Three of the observed authentication problems are highly id-
iosyncratic, and may not even be automatically detectable with complex custom
properties. However, the remaining problem should be dynamically detectable
using “off-the-shelf” ERC20 token semantics properties.
Reentrancy Reentrancy is a widely discussed and investigated flaw in Ethereum
smart contracts [1]. In a reentrancy attack, a contract calls an external contract,
before “internal work” (primarily state changes) is finished. Through some route,
the external contract re-enters code that expected the internal work to be com-
plete. No reentrancy problems detected in audits were high-low, but 50% of the
findings were high severity. Reentrancy is a serious problem, but, due to its
well-defined structure, is usually amenable to static and dynamic detection. In
particular, static detection with relatively few false positives is probably already
possible using Slither, for most important reentrancies.
Error Reporting Error reporting findings involve cases in which a contract
does not properly report, propagate, or handle error conditions. There are no
high-low error reporting findings in the audits, but 29% of error reporting find-
ings are high severity. In some cases error reporting is a difficulty category to
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capture without further specification, and specifying that errors should be re-
ported or handled in a certain way generally requires the same understanding
that would have produced correct code in the first place. However, ERC20 seman-
tics make some error reporting problems easy to automatically detect. Incorrect
error propagation is also usually statically detectable [21]; however, this was not
the type of error reporting problem discovered in audits.
Configuration Configuration findings generally describe cases in which a bad
configuration may lead to bad behavior even when the contract itself is correct. In
smart contracts, this is often related to financial effects, e.g., bad market/pricing
parameters. There are no high-low findings in this category, but 40% of findings
are high priority. Configuration problems are usually fairly subtle, or even eco-
nomic/financial in nature, and detection is likely to rely on manual analysis.
Logic Logic findings describe incorrect protocols or business logic, where the im-
plementation is as intended, but the reasoning behind the intention is incorrect.
Somewhat surprisingly, this category has no high-low findings, and only three
fundamental logic flaws were described in the audits. One of the three logic flaws
described was high severity, however. Based on the small number of findings it
is hard to guess how often custom properties might allow dynamic detection of
logic flaws. If the bad logic often leads to a violation of the expected invariants
of a contract, then it can be detected, but if the fault is in the understanding of
desirable invariants (which may often be the case), manual inspection by another
set of expert eyes may be the only plausible detection method.
Data Exposure Data exposure findings are those in which information that
should not be public is made public. For instance, some smart contracts of-
fer guarantees to users regarding the information about them stored on the
blockchain. If an attacker can infer data about users by observing confirmed or
unconfirmed transactions, then that is classified as a data exposure issue. There
are no high-low data exposure findings, but 33% are high severity. Most data
exposure problems are not likely to be amenable to automatic detection.
Timing Timing findings concern cases (that are neither race conditions nor
front-running) where manipulation of timing has negative consequences. For the
most part, these findings involved assuming intervals between events (especially
blocks) that may not hold in practice. One of the four timing findings (the only
high severity one) was high-low. Timing problems can be amenable to automated
detection in that static or dynamic analysis can certainly recognize when code
depends on, for instance, the block timestamp.
Coding-Bug Coding-bug is a catch-all category for problems that, whatever
their consequences, amount to a “typo” in code, rather than a likely intentional
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error on a developer’s part. Off-by-one loop bounds that do not traverse an entire
array are a simple example. There were no high-low or high-severity coding bugs
in the smart contracts audited, which suggests that the worst simple coding
problems may be detected by existing unit tests or human inspection of code,
in the relatively small code bases of even larger smart contracts. On the other
hand, 67% of coding bugs were medium severity, the second-highest rate for that
severity; only one other class exceeded 41% medium-severity findings.
Front-Running Front-running generalizes the financial market concept of front-
running, where a trader uses advance non-public knowledge of a pending trans-
action to “predict” future prices and/or buy or sell before the pending state
change. In smart contracts, this means that a contract 1) exposes information
about future state changes (especially to a “market”) and 2) allows transactions
that exploit this knowledge. It is both a timing and data exposure problem, but
is assigned its own category because the remedy is often different. Front-running
is a well-known concern in smart contracts, but in fact no high-low or even high-
severity front-running problems were detected in our audits. On the other hand,
front-running had the largest percent of medium-severity findings (80%), so it is
not an insignificant problem. Front-running, by its nature, is probably hard to
detect dynamically, and very hard to detect statically.
Auditing and Logging Auditing and logging findings describe inadequate or
incorrect logging; in most cases incorrect or missing contract events. There were
no high-low, high-severity, or medium-severity auditing or logging findings. If
explicit checks for events are included in (automated) testing, such problems
can easily be detected, but if such checks are included, the important events
are also likely to be present and correct, so this is not a great fit for dynamic
analysis. On the other hand, it is often easy to statically note when an important
state change is made but no event is associated with it.
Missing-Logic Missing-logic findings are cases in which—rather than incor-
rect logic for handling a particular set of inputs, or missing validation to exclude
those inputs—there is a correct way to handle inputs, but it is missing. Struc-
turally, missing-logic means that code should add another branch to handle a
special case. Interestingly, while this seems like a potentially serious issue, there
were no high-low or even medium-severity missing-logic findings. The ease of
detecting missing logic with custom properties depends on the consequences of
the omission; static analysis seems unlikely find most missing logic.
Cryptography Cryptography findings concern cases where incorrect or insuf-
ficient cryptography is used. In our smart contract audits, the one (low sever-
ity, high difficulty) cryptography finding concerned use of an improper pseudo-
random number generator, something a static analysis tool can often flag in the
blockchain context, where bad sources of randomness are fairly limited.
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Category # % Change Category # % Change
data validation 41 53% -17% patching 6 8% -1%
denial of service 23 30% -26% authentication 5 6% -4%
configuration 20 26% -24% timing 4 5% -3%
data exposure 18 23% -22% numerics 2 3% +3%
access controls 14 18% -8% auditing and logging 2 3% +1%
cryptography 12 16% -16% race condition 1 1% +6%
undefined behavior 7 9% -4% error reporting 1 1% +2%
Table 3. Most common finding categories in other audits.
Documentation Documentation findings describe cases where the contract
code is not incorrect, but there is missing or erroneous documentation. As you
would expect, this is never a high- or even medium-severity issue, and is not
amenable to automated detection.
API Inconsistency API inconsistencies are cases in which a contract’s in-
dividual functions are correct, but the calling pattern or semantics of related
functionalities differs in a way likely to mislead a user and produce incorrect
code calling the contract. All of these issues were informational, and while it is
conceivable that machine learning approaches could identify API inconsistencies,
it is not a low-hanging fruit for automated detection.
Code-Quality Finally, code quality issues have no semantic impact, but involve
code that is hard to read or maintain. As expected, such issues are purely infor-
mational. Code quality problems in general would seem to be highly amenable
to static analysis, but not to dynamic analysis.
3.2 Comparison to Non-Smart-Contract Audits
It is interesting to compare the distribution of finding types for smart contract
audits to other security audits [29] performed by the same company. Table 3
compares smart contract audit frequencies with those for a random sample of
15 non-smart contract audits, with categories never present in smart contract
audits or only present in smart contract audits removed.
The largest changes are categories of findings that are common in other
audits, but not common in smart contracts. One of these, denial of service, may
be primarily due to the re-categorization of denial of service findings with a clear
relevance to another category in the smart contract findings. Changing the five
findings whose type was clarified back to denial of service still leaves a significant
gap, however. This is likely due to the different nature of interactions with the
network in non-smart-contract code; in a sense, many denial of service problems
and solutions are delegated to the general Ethereum blockchain, so individual
contracts have less responsibility and thus fewer problems.
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A more general version of the same difference likely explains why configu-
ration problems are far less prevalent in smart contract code. At heart, smart
contracts are more specialized and focused, and live in a simple environment
(e.g., no OS/network interactions), so the footprint of configurations, and thus
possible mis-configurations, is smaller. Similarly, the temptation to roll your own
cryptography in a smart contract is much smaller. For one thing, implementing
any custom cryptography in Solidity would be impractical enough to daunt even
those unwise enough to attempt it, and gas costs would be prohibitive. Data
validation is also easier in a world where, for the most part, transactions are the
only inputs. Data exposure problems are probably less common because it is well
understood that information on the blockchain is public, so the amount of data
that is presumed unexposed is much smaller, or, in many cases, non-existent.
3.3 Threats to Validity
Contracts submitted for audit varied in their level of maturity; some assessments
were performed on contracts essentially ready for release (or already released)
that reflected the final stage of internal quality control processes. Others were
performed on much more preliminary implementations and designs. This does
not invalidate the findings, but some flaw types may be more prevalent in less
polished contracts. Of course, the primary threat to validity is that the data is
all drawn from a set of 23 audits performed by one company over a period of
about two years. We address this concern in Section 5.
4 Discussion: How to Find Flaws in Smart Contracts
4.1 Property-Based Testing and Symbolic Execution
Property-based testing [5,15,12] involves 1) a user defining custom properties
(usually, in practice, reachability properties declaring certain system states or
function return values as “bad”), and then 2) using either fuzzing or symbolic
execution to attempt to find inputs or call sequences violating the properties.
Some variant of property-based testing is a popular approach to smart contract
analysis. Automated testing with custom properties is both a significant low-
hanging fruit and anything but a panacea. Of the 246 findings, only 91 could be
possibly labeled as detectable with user-defined properties, or with automated
testing for standard semantics of ERC20 tokens and other off-the-shelf dynamic
checks. On the other hand, 17 of the 27 most important, high severity, low
difficulty, findings, were plausibly detectable using such properties. While not
effective for some classes of problems, analysis using custom properties (and
thus, likely, dynamic rather than static analysis), might have detected over 60%
of the most important findings. This mismatch in overall (37%) and high-low
(63%) percent of findings amenable to property-based testing is likely due to the
fact that categories almost never detectable by automated testing—code quality,
documentation, auditing and logging—are seldom high-low, and those where it
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is most effective—data validation, access controls, and numerics—constitute a
large portion of the total set of high-low findings. Also, intuition tells us that if a
finding has major detrimental consequences (high severity) but is not extremely
hard to exploit (low difficulty) this is precisely the class of problems a set of key
invariants plus effective fuzzing or symbolic execution is suited to find.
4.2 Static Analysis
The full potential of static analysis is harder to estimate. Four of the issues
in these findings were definitely detected using the Slither static analysis tool,
which has continued to add new detectors and fix bugs since the majority of the
audits were performed. Of these four issues, one was high severity, undetermined
difficulty, a classic reentrancy. An additional four issues are certainly detectable
using Slither (these involve deletion of mappings, which is also the root issue in
one of the findings that was definitely detected by Slither). Some of the over-
flow/underflow problems, as noted above, might also be statically detectable if
false positives are allowed. There are likely other individual findings amenable
to static analysis, but determining the practicality of such detection is in some
ways more difficult than with dynamic analysis using a property-based specifi-
cation. The low-hanging fruit for static analysis is general patterns of bad code,
not reachability of a complex bad state. While some cases in which we speculate
that a finding is describable by a reachability property may not, in fact, prove
practical—current tools may have too much trouble generating a transaction
sequence demonstrating the problem—it is fairly easy to determine that there
is indeed an actual state of the contract that can be identified with the finding.
Whether a finding falls into a more general pattern not currently captured by,
for instance, a Slither detector, is harder to say, since the rate of false positives
and scalability of precision needed to identify a problem is very hard to estimate.
Our conservative guess is that perhaps 65 of the 246 findings (26%), and 9 of the
high-low findings (33%), are plausibly detectable by static analysis. While these
are lower percentages than for dynamic approaches, the effort required is much,
much lower: The dynamic analysis usually depends on a user actually thinking
of, and correctly implementing, the right property, as well as a tool reaching
the bad state. For the statically detectable problems, issues like those in these
findings would almost always be found just by running the static analysis tool.
4.3 Unit Testing
There was no additional unit testing as part of the security audits performed.
It is therefore impossible to say how effective adding unit tests would be in
discovering flaws during audits, based on this data. However, it is possible to
examine the relationship between pre-existing unit tests and the audit results.
Fourteen of the contracts audited had what appeared to be considerable unit
tests; it is impossible to determine the quality of these tests, but there was
certainly quantity, and significant development effort. Two of the contracts had
moderate unit tests; not as good as the 14 contracts in the first category, but still
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representing a serious effort to use unit testing. Two contracts had modest unit
tests: non-trivial, but clearly far from complete tests. Three had weak unit tests;
technically there were unit tests, but they are practically of almost no value in
checking the correctness of the contract. Finally, two contracts appeared to have
no unit tests at all. Did the quantity of unit tests have an impact on audit results?
If so, the impact was far from clear. The contracts that appeared to lack unit tests
had nine and four findings, respectively: fewer than most other contracts. The
largest mean number of issues (11.5) was for contracts with modest unit tests,
but essentially the mean finding counts for considerable (11.1), moderate (10.5),
modest (11.5), and weak (11) unit tests were indistinguishable. Furthermore,
restricting the analysis to counting only high-severity findings also produces no
significant correlation. For total findings, Kendall τ correlation is an extremely
weak 0.09 (p = 0.61 ) indicating even this correlation is likely to be pure chance.
For high-severity findings, the τ correlation drops to 0.5 (p = 0.78). Note further
that these weak/unsupported correlations are in the “wrong” direction. It seems
fair to say that even extensive unit tests are not the most effective way to avoid
the kind of problems found in high-quality security audits.
4.4 Manual Analysis
With few exceptions, these findings demonstrate the effectiveness of manual
analysis. Expert attention from experienced auditors can reveal serious problems
even in well-tested code bases. While four of the audits produced no high-severity
findings, 11 audits found three or more. As far as we can tell, all of the high-
low severity issues were the result of manual analysis alone, though there were
recommendations for how to use tools to detect/confirm correction in some cases.
4.5 Recommendations
The set of findings that could possibly be detected by either dynamic or static
analysis is slightly more than 50%, and, most importantly, includes 21 of the
27 high-low findings. That is, making generous assumptions about scalability,
property-writing, and willingness to wade through false positives, a skilled user
of both static and dynamic tools could detect more than three out of four high-
low issues. Note that the use of both approaches is key: 61 findings overall and 12
high-low findings are likely to only be detectable dynamically, while 35 findings,
four of them high-low, are likely to only by found using static analysis.
While static analysis alone is less powerful than manual audits or dynamic
analysis, the low effort, and thus high cost-benefit ratio, makes the use of all
available high-quality static analysis tools an obvious recommendation. (Also,
printers and code understanding tools often provided by static analyzers make
manual audits more effective [9].) Some of the findings in these audits could have
been easily detected by developers using then-current versions of the best tools.
When 35% of high-severity findings are not likely to be detected even with
considerable tool improvement and manual effort to write correctness properties,
it is implausible to claim that tools will be a “silver bullet” for smart contract
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security. It is difficult, at best, to imagine that nearly half of the total findings
and almost 25% of the high-low findings would be detected even with high-
effort, high-expertise construction of custom properties and the use of better-
than-state-of-the-art dynamic and static analysis. Therefore, manual audits by
external experts will remain a key part of serious security and correctness efforts
for smart contracts for the foreseeable future.
On the other hand, the gap between current tool-based detection rates (very
low) and our estimated upper limit on detection rates (50% of all issues, and over
75% of the most important issues) suggests that there is a large potential payoff
from improving state-of-the-art standards for analysis tools and putting more ef-
fort into property-based testing. The experience of the security community using
AFL, libFuzzer, and other tools also suggests that there are “missing” findings.
The relatively immature state of analysis tools when most of these audits were
performed likely means that bugs unlikely to be detected by human reasoning
were probably not detected. The effectiveness of fuzzing in general suggests that
such bugs likely exist in smart contracts as well, especially since the most impor-
tant target category of findings for dynamic analyses, data validation, remains a
major source of smart contract findings. In fact, a possible additional explana-
tion for the difference of 36% data validation findings for smart contract audits
and 51% for non-smart-contract audits could be that non-smart-contract audits
have access to more powerful fuzzers. Eliminating the low-hanging fruit for au-
tomated tools will give auditors more time to focus on the vulnerabilities that
require humans-in-the-loop and specialized skills. Moreover, effort spent writing
custom properties is likely to pay off, even if dynamic analysis tools are not yet
good enough to produce a failing test. Just understanding what invariants should
hold is often enough to alert a human to a flaw.
Finally, while it is impossible to make strong claims based on a set of only
23 audits, it seems likely that unit tests, even quite substantial ones, do not
provide an effective strategy for avoiding the kinds of problems detected during
audits. Unit tests, of course, have other important uses, and should be considered
an essential part of high-quality code development, but developer-constructed
manual unit tests may not really help detect high-severity security issues. It
does seem likely that the effort involved in writing high-quality unit tests would
be very helpful in dynamic analysis: Generalizing from unit tests to invariants
and properties for property-based testing seems likely to be an effective way to
detect some of what the audits exposed.
5 Audits From Other Companies
In order to partially validate our findings, we also performed an analysis of au-
dits prepared by two other leading companies in the field [27], ChainSecurity
and ConsenSys Diligence. While differences in reporting standards and catego-
rizations, and the fact that we do not have access to unpublished reports (which
could bias statistics), make it difficult to analyze these results with the same
confidence as our own reports, the overall picture that emerged was broadly
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compatible with our conclusions. The assignment of findings to semantically
equivalent difficulties and severities, and the assessment of potential for auto-
mated analysis methods, was performed by a completely independent team. The
results summarized here are for 225 findings in public reports for ChainSecurity
and 168 from ConsenSys Diligence, over 19 and 18 audits, respectively. Appendix
B provides detailed results on these findings.
First, the potential of automated methods is similar. For ChainSecurity, 39%
of all issues were plausibly detectable by dynamic analysis (e.g., property-based
testing, possibly with a custom property), and 22% by automated static anal-
ysis. For ConsenSys Diligence, those numbers were 41% and 24%. Restricting
our interest to high-low findings, the percentages were 67% and 63% for dy-
namic analysis and 11% and 38% for static analysis, respectively. Combining
both methods, the potential detection rates were 51% and 52% for all findings,
and 67% and 75% for high-low findings. The extreme similarity of these results
to ours affirms that our results concerning detection methods are unlikely to be
an artifact of our audit methods or the specific set of contracts we audited.
Second, while the category frequencies were quite different than those in our
audits (e.g., more numerics and access controls, fewer data validation findings),
there were no new categories, and all of our categories were present (though
ChainSecurity found no race conditions). Reentrancy was not, as previous lit-
erature might lead one to suspect, a prominent source of high-low problems, or
even a very common problem, and there was only one high-low reentrancy.
6 Conclusions
Understanding how best to protect high-value smart contracts against attack-
ers (and against serious errors by non-malicious users or the creators of the
contract) is difficult in the absence of information about the actual problems
found in high-value smart contracts by experienced auditors using state-of-the-
art technologies. This paper presents a wealth of empirical evidence to help
smart-contract developers, security researchers, and security auditors improve
their understanding of the types of faults found in contracts, and the potential
for various methods to detect those faults. Based on an in-depth examination of
23 paid smart contract audits performed by Trail of Bits, validated by a more
limited examination of public audits performed by ChainSecurity and Consen-
Sys Diligence , we conclude that 1) the literature is somewhat misleading with
respect to the most important kinds of smart contract flaws, which are more
like flaws in other critical code than one might think; 2) there is likely a large
potential payoff in making more effective use of automatic static and dynamic
analyses to detect the worst problems in smart contracts; 3) nonetheless, many
key issues will never be amenable to purely-automated or formal approaches,
and 4) high-quality unit tests alone do not provide effective protection against
serious contract flaws. As future work, we plan to extend our analysis of other
companies’ audits to include unit test quality, and examine issues that cut across
findings categories, such as the power of ERC20 standards to help find flaws.
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Appendix A: Raw Counts for Finding Categories
This table provides exact counts for categories, and severities within categories,
for our analysis.
Severity Difficulty
Category # High-Low High Med. Low Info. Und. High Med. Low Und.
data validation 89 10 19 32 21 12 5 24 14 49 2
access controls 24 6 10 6 3 5 0 8 3 13 0
race condition 17 0 7 7 1 2 0 17 0 0 0
numerics 13 3 4 3 5 1 0 4 1 8 0
undefined behavior 13 3 4 2 4 1 2 2 1 10 0
patching 18 2 3 2 7 5 1 1 2 11 4
denial of service 10 1 2 3 3 2 0 5 0 4 1
authentication 4 1 2 1 1 0 0 2 0 2 0
reentrancy 4 0 2 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 1
error reporting 7 0 2 1 0 4 0 3 2 2 0
configuration 5 0 2 0 1 1 1 3 1 1 0
logic 3 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 0 0 0
data exposure 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
timing 4 1 1 0 3 0 0 3 0 1 0
coding-bug 6 0 0 4 2 0 0 1 0 5 0
front-running 5 0 0 4 0 1 0 5 0 0 0
auditing and logging 9 0 0 0 3 4 2 3 0 5 1
missing-logic 3 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 3 0
cryptography 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
documentation 4 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 3 1
API inconsistency 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0
code-quality 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0
Total 246 27 60 68 60 46 12 88 26 122 10
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Appendix B: Detailed Results for ChainSecurity and
ConsenSys Diligence Smart Contract Audits
The process for analyzing findings in other companies’ audits involved 1) map-
ping the category of the finding to our set, which was not always simple or obvi-
ous, and 2) translating a different formulation of worst-case impact and proba-
bility estimation into our high-low severity and high-low difficulty schemes. For
information on the original categorizations of issues (using a different severity
and likelihood scheme), see the full data set online [27]. A potential source of
bias in these results is that we do not know the results for non-public audits for
these companies; for our own audits, there was no obvious difference between
public and non-public audits, however. Due to the lack of access to source code
versions associated with audits, we were unfortunately unable to correlate unit
test quality at time of audit with issue counts for external audits.
Note that both companies reported a large number of code quality issues
that would not have been considered findings at all in our own audits, but
simply noted in a Code Quality appendix to an audit report. We removed 66 and
168 such relatively trivial (“lint-like”) findings, respectively, for ChainSecurity
and ConsenSys Diligence; including these would greatly increase the counts for
informational issues and the code-quality category.
The first two tables show severity and difficulty distributions for finding
categories for other company audits, as in Table 1. In all cases, the first table
in each pair of tables is for ChainSecurity, and the second is for ConsenSys
Diligence.
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Severity Difficulty
Category % High-Low High Med. Low Info. Und. High Med. Low Und.
access controls 24% 8% 28% 21% 45% 6% 0% 40% 26% 34% 0%
data validation 14% 3% 19% 28% 47% 6% 0% 47% 9% 44% 0%
logic 6% 7% 36% 50% 14% 0% 0% 29% 50% 21% 0%
numerics 9% 0% 10% 15% 75% 0% 0% 40% 20% 40% 0%
denial of service 5% 0% 17% 25% 58% 0% 0% 67% 33% 0% 0%
configuration 3% 14% 29% 29% 43% 0% 0% 71% 0% 29% 0%
authentication 2% 0% 50% 25% 25% 0% 0% 0% 75% 25% 0%
coding-bug 2% 20% 40% 0% 60% 0% 0% 20% 0% 80% 0%
missing-logic 4% 0% 13% 13% 63% 13% 0% 25% 0% 75% 0%
cryptography 1% 50% 50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 50% 0%
patching 7% 0% 7% 0% 73% 20% 0% 87% 13% 0% 0%
reentrancy 2% 0% 20% 0% 80% 0% 0% 80% 0% 20% 0%
documentation 4% 0% 13% 0% 50% 38% 0% 13% 13% 63% 0%
data exposure 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%
timing 5% 0% 0% 27% 64% 9% 0% 45% 27% 27% 0%
front-running 2% 0% 0% 25% 75% 0% 0% 75% 25% 0% 0%
auditing and logging 3% 0% 0% 14% 29% 57% 0% 14% 0% 86% 0%
error reporting 2% 0% 0% 25% 50% 25% 0% 0% 25% 75% 0%
undefined behavior 1% 0% 0% 50% 50% 0% 0% 50% 50% 0% 0%
API-inconsistency 2% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 40% 0% 60% 0%
code-quality 3% 0% 0% 0% 50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 83% 0%
race condition 0% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
What are the Actual Flaws in Important Smart Contracts? 21
Severity Difficulty
Category % High-Low High Med. Low Info. Und. High Med. Low Und.
access controls 10% 0% 35% 12% 47% 6% 0% 29% 29% 41% 0%
configuration 10% 6% 25% 13% 56% 0% 0% 56% 6% 31% 6%
front-running 4% 14% 57% 14% 29% 0% 0% 71% 14% 14% 0%
reentrancy 4% 14% 43% 43% 14% 0% 0% 57% 14% 29% 0%
coding-bug 6% 10% 30% 10% 50% 10% 0% 20% 10% 70% 0%
logic 8% 8% 15% 31% 54% 0% 0% 15% 23% 62% 0%
numerics 13% 5% 10% 14% 71% 5% 0% 52% 24% 24% 0%
data validation 6% 0% 10% 20% 70% 0% 0% 50% 20% 30% 0%
API inconsistency 2% 0% 25% 25% 50% 0% 0% 25% 0% 75% 0%
cryptography 1% 50% 50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 50% 0%
error reporting 3% 20% 20% 0% 80% 0% 0% 20% 0% 80% 0%
timing 2% 0% 25% 0% 75% 0% 0% 50% 0% 50% 0%
race condition 1% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%
missing-logic 11% 0% 0% 26% 68% 5% 0% 0% 11% 84% 0%
authentication 1% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 50% 50% 0% 0%
denial of service 2% 0% 0% 67% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 33% 0%
documentation 2% 0% 0% 33% 33% 33% 0% 67% 0% 33% 0%
data exposure 1% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0%
code-quality 7% 0% 0% 0% 82% 9% 0% 45% 9% 36% 0%
patching 3% 0% 0% 0% 80% 20% 0% 80% 0% 20% 0%
undefined behavior 1% 0% 0% 0% 50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
auditing and logging 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0%
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The next two tables show absolute severity and difficulty counts for finding
categories for other company audits, as in Appendix A.
Severity Difficulty
Category # High-Low High Med. Low Info. Und. High Med. Low Und.
access controls 53 4 15 11 24 3 0 21 14 18 0
data validation 32 1 6 9 15 2 0 15 3 14 0
logic 14 1 5 7 2 0 0 4 7 3 0
numerics 20 0 2 3 15 0 0 8 4 8 0
denial of service 12 0 2 3 7 0 0 8 4 0 0
configuration 7 1 2 2 3 0 0 5 0 2 0
authentication 4 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 3 1 0
coding-bug 5 1 2 0 3 0 0 1 0 4 0
missing-logic 8 0 1 1 5 1 0 2 0 6 0
cryptography 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
patching 15 0 1 0 11 3 0 13 2 0 0
reentrancy 5 0 1 0 4 0 0 4 0 1 0
documentation 8 0 1 0 4 3 0 1 1 5 0
data exposure 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
timing 11 0 0 3 7 1 0 5 3 3 0
front-running 4 0 0 1 3 0 0 3 1 0 0
auditing and logging 7 0 0 1 2 4 0 1 0 6 0
error reporting 4 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 3 0
undefined behavior 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
API inconsistency 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 3 0
code-quality 6 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 5 0
Total 225 9 42 45 117 21 0 96 44 83 0
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Severity Difficulty
Category # High-Low High Med. Low Info. Und. High Med. Low Und.
access controls 17 0 6 2 8 1 0 5 5 7 0
configuration 16 1 4 2 9 0 0 9 1 5 1
front-running 7 1 4 1 2 0 0 5 1 1 0
reentrancy 7 1 3 3 1 0 0 4 1 2 0
coding-bug 10 1 3 1 5 1 0 2 1 7 0
logic 13 1 2 4 7 0 0 2 3 8 0
numerics 21 1 2 3 15 1 0 11 5 5 0
data validation 10 0 1 2 7 0 0 5 2 3 0
API inconsistency 4 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 3 0
cryptography 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
error reporting 5 1 1 0 4 0 0 1 0 4 0
timing 4 0 1 0 3 0 0 2 0 2 0
race condition 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
missing-logic 19 0 0 5 13 1 0 0 2 16 0
authentication 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
denial of service 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
documentation 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 0
data exposure 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
code-quality 11 0 0 0 9 1 0 5 1 4 0
patching 5 0 0 0 4 1 0 4 0 1 0
undefined behavior 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
auditing and logging 5 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 0
Total 168 8 30 31 91 13 0 61 24 77 3
The final two tables report the estimated automated dynamic and static
analysis detection potential for the categories in the other companies’ audits.
Category % Dynamic % Static Category % Dynamic % Static
access controls 43% 6% reentrancy 60% 100%
data validation 31% 13% documentation 0% 0%
logic 50% 7% data exposure 0% 0%
numerics 80% 55% timing 36% 36%
denial of service 33% 25% front-running 0% 0%
configuration 29% 0% auditing and logging 0% 0%
authentication 50% 25% error reporting 100% 25%
coding-bug 100% 40% undefined behavior 0% 50%
missing-logic 63% 0% API-inconsistency 20% 20%
cryptography 50% 0% code-quality 0% 17%
patching 7% 73% race condition N/A N/A
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Category % Dynamic % Static Category % Dynamic % Static
access controls 18% 12% timing 25% 0%
configuration 31% 25% race condition 0% 0%
front-running 0% 0% missing-logic 47% 0%
reentrancy 100% 71% authentication 50% 0%
coding-bug 50% 10% denial of service 67% 0%
logic 62% 8% documentation 0% 0%
numerics 95% 71% data exposure 0% 0%
data validation 20% 10% code-quality 9% 45%
API inconsistency 50% 25% patching 0% 60%
cryptography 100% 0% undefined behavior 0% 50%
error reporting 20% 40% auditing and logging 0% 0%
